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SPEECH RESTRICTIONS THAT DON’T 
MUCH AFFECT THE AUTONOMY OF 
SPEAKERS 
Eugene Volokh* 
I. SPEECH RESTRICTIONS WITH LITTLE IMPACT  
ON SPEAKERS 
The sad occasion of Ed Baker’s untimely death is perhaps 
a fitting reason to reflect on the speech of those who are no 
longer living. Most of what is worth reading was written by au-
thors who have died. All of what is now worth reading will one 
day fall in the same category. 
I take it none of us thinks such material is or should be less 
constitutionally protected than the writings of the living. I 
know of no court that has suggested any such thing. Yet the 
speech of authors who are now dead poses a difficulty for 
speaker-based free speech theories (or speaker-based compo-
nents of broader theories). 
Say the government were to ban a book written by a now-
dead author: Aristotle, Machiavelli, Marx, Hitler, Orwell. Such 
a ban would have no effect on the author’s autonomy. 
It would not deny him an opportunity to “fully develop a 
complex mental world, identify its contents, evaluate them, and 
distinguish between those that are merely given and those one 
endorses.”1 It would not interfere with “the appropriate develop-
ment and regulation of the [author’s] self, and of [the author’s] 
relation to others,”2 at least if “relation to others” means the 
relation of actual living human beings. It would not interfere 
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 1. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 
CONST. COMMENT. 283, 292 (2011). 
 2. Id. at 294. 
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with the author’s “authority (or right) to make decisions about” 
himself.3 Those authors are beyond the writ of governments. 
What is wrong with such bans, it seems to me, is that they 
burden the rights of the living, not of the dead—of readers, not 
of authors. Some might identify, I suppose, some symbolic in-
terference with the author’s “self-expression,” but in the ab-
sence of a living self such interference is metaphor, not reality. 
Some might suggest that a few authors could be deterred 
from speaking during their lives by the fear that their influence 
will be legally blocked after their death, but that seems unlike-
ly. Even those who think they write for the ages are unlikely to 
be much affected by the possibility that some government some 
time after their death might restrict their works. 
Some might point to the rights of future “speakers,” such 
as publishers or booksellers. But while the law rightly protects 
such rights to convey the speech of others, surely the real tra-
gedy of a ban on Ed Baker’s works—or on Aristotle’s works—
would not be that it will interfere with the speech of a future 
bookseller. And of course many works are made public through 
largely automated mechanisms such as Google Books or Hein-
Online, whose operators may not even make any conscious 
choice about what to publish. It can’t really be booksellers’ 
rights that are chiefly at stake here. 
Rather, once time removes the author from the realm of 
those who possess rights, what is left is the reader. Life, and the 
law, are for the living. And the reader’s rights are entirely suffi-
cient to provide the works of now-dead authors with full First 
Amendment protection. 
Consider likewise the republication of a leaked document: 
an internal government report, a business’s memo describing its 
plan to close plants, a business’s investigation of whether its 
products make people sick, or a political advocacy group’s 
long-term strategy for accomplishing its political goals. Let’s 
call this the “pure leak republication” scenario. And consider 
alongside it the republication of a leaked document together 
with careful analysis and criticism of the document by the re-
publisher, which we’ll call the “speaker-supplemented leak re-
publication” scenario. 
 
 3. Ed Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 254 (2011). 
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Pure leak republication does not do much to advance 
speakers’ autonomy, or their development as thinkers. In many 
cases, the original authors did not wish the documents to be re-
leased.4 Whatever the value of the publication to listeners, it 
doesn’t seem to be respectful of the authors’ mental autonomy. 
Moreover, if the report was an internal corporate document, 
then under Ed’s and Seana’s own framework, the development 
of the report would not have involved sufficient “thinking” to 
justify full protection. After all, Ed’s and Seana’s conclusions 
that commercial advertising and nonmedia corporate speech 
aren’t fully constitutionally protected rest largely on the view 
that business employees’ speech is generally not sufficiently 
self-expressive, or not sufficiently connected to their status as 
“thinkers.”5 
The leaker must have thought about whether to leak the 
documents, but I doubt this thinking would suffice to qualify 
the leak for full constitutional protection under Ed’s or Sea-
na’s framework. After all, advertising agency employees and 
corporate press release writers do some thinking about what 
to write for their bosses, as well as about the morality of 
whether to write it—but that isn’t enough, under Ed’s and 
Seana’s models, to qualify such employees for full speaker-as-
thinker protection. Plus one can imagine situations where the 
document wasn’t even deliberately leaked, but just accidental-
ly released. 
Likewise, though the recipient of the leak (say, a newspa-
per editor or a Web site operator) must have thought about 
whether to publish the leaked document, that thinking is also 
likely not sufficient for full protection under Ed’s and Seana’s 
framework. And of course such thinking might well have been 
largely motivated by market pressures, focusing more on 
whether the document will draw paying readers and advertisers 
than on any deeper moral questions. If so, then it would be 
hard to distinguish the speech from the economically shaped 
speech of advertisers or non-media business corporations—
speech that, under Ed’s and Seana’s approach, lacks sufficient 
value as self-expression. 
 
 4. I say “in many cases” because sometimes the author of a report might be 
pleased to see it published, and it is only the author’s superiors who are keeping it secret. 
But in many cases the author would not want it published, and might in fact be badly 
embarrassed and professionally harmed by its publication. 
 5. See infra Part III. 
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Yet I take it that the case for protecting such pure leak 
publications remains strong, because of the interests of readers 
(including the possibility that the readers’ own future speech 
will be affected by what they learn from the published leaks). 
Perhaps in some situations such speech may nonetheless be re-
stricted, for various reasons.6 But that possibility applies equal-
ly to the pure leak publications and to the speaker-
supplemented leak publications. And the arguments for protec-
tion also apply equally to both kinds of leak publications, even 
though the speaker adds nearly no intellectual content to the 
pure leak publication, but a great deal of such content to the 
speaker-supplemented leak publication.7 
Or consider the accidental recording. Say a convenience 
store owner finds that one of his security cameras has captured 
something noteworthy (say, a police beating of a citizen). He 
then posts it on his Web site, thinking solely of the traffic and 
advertising revenue that it would bring.8 
There was no thinking-as-human-development involved in 
the original creation of the videotape—none of the creativity of 
a professional videographer staging the shot, or the thinking 
needed to track down the person or thing that a reporter might 
want to videorecord. The decision to post the tape is, by our 
hypothesis, motivated by a desire for money, not by a desire to 
make a political statement. Yet I take it that the posted acci-
dental recording should nonetheless be fully protected, because 
of the value of the video to viewers. 
 
 6. Maybe some narrow restrictions are permissible if the information would help 
people commit serious physical harm (consider the classic “sailing dates of troopships” 
hypothetical). Or maybe the speech could be restricted if the speaker actively conspired 
with the leaker—and is thus responsible for the leaker’s breach of his confidentiality ob-
ligations—rather than just passively receiving the document from an unknown source. 
Or, as some argue, maybe all or most such publications should be restricted, because of a 
compelling interest in removing leakers’ incentive to break their confidentially promises. 
 7. The one area in which the law distinguishes republication with no extra com-
mentary from republication with a great deal of extra commentary is copyright law’s fair 
use doctrine. But this distinction stems from special factors related to copyright law and 
the value it places on “transformative” works. See generally Harper & Row Publishers, 
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U. S. 539, 550 (1985) (explaining the difference between fair 
use and piracy); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576–77 (1994) (listing 
the factors to consider when determining whether a use is fair). The distinction does not 
justify any more general difference in treatment between pure leak republication and 
speaker-supplemented leak republication. 
 8. For a similar such incident, consider the Zapruder film that inadvertently cap-
tured the assassination of President Kennedy. 
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II. LISTENER INTERESTS IN COMMERCIAL AND 
CORPORATE SPEECH 
So I hope that I’ve demonstrated that speech should be 
protected even if its chief value is to listeners, not to speakers. 
And of course both Ed’s autonomy-based theory and Seana’s 
thinker-based theory have room for the listeners’ interests in 
autonomy, and in their development as thinkers. But once we 
recognize the force of these listener interests, then it’s hard for 
me to see how those theories can sustain the argument that (to 
quote Seana) “non-press, business corporate and commercial 
speech may be different and that their protection may assume a 
weaker form and may rest upon separate, more context-
dependent and instrumental, foundations.”9 
For now let’s assume, though I’m not sure this assumption 
is valid, that those forms of speech involve lesser autonomy or 
thinker interests of speakers than do other forms of speech.10 
Yet such speech can be of use to listeners as thinkers, and as 
autonomous citizens. If the value to listeners of the work of the 
dead, of the leaked documents, and of the accidentally cap-
tured video suffices to fully protect such material, why 
shouldn’t it equally suffice to fully protect corporate and com-
mercial speech? 
Again, let us assume that information or argument con-
tained in commercial speech and non-media corporate speech 
“does not involve in any direct or straightforward fashion the 
revelation of [authors’] mental contents.” And reading a dead 
writer’s works does generally reveal the writer’s mental con-
tents as of the time he was writing. But why should that matter, 
when—as with the works of dead authors—the only continuing 
mental development at stake is not the author’s, but the read-
er’s? 
Seana’s response seems to be that, 
 
 9. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 295. 
 10. Among other things, many professionals and small businesspeople may sincere-
ly believe in the quality and social value of their products or services, and their advertis-
ing may accurately reflect their thinking. Yet many of the Court’s commercial speech 
cases involve speech by individuals; consider, for instance, the long line of lawyer adver-
tising cases. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995); Shapero v. Ky. 
Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 
(1985); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 
433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
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Of course, thinkers may have an interest in [having] access 
to corporate speech because corporate and commercial 
speech may serve as a source of information about one’s en-
vironment, but, in other circumstances, the point of corpo-
rate speech, as well as other commercial speech, is to alter 
the environment, e.g. to manufacture desire, not to report 
it.11 
But, as the very next sentences in Seana’s article acknowledge, 
“altering the environment is also the aim of advocacy speech by 
individuals as well. That aim in no way diminishes the protec-
tion that should be afforded to it.”12 So we still haven’t come to 
an explanation for why commercial and non-media corporate 
speech is different from advocacy speech for purposes of the 
listeners’ role as thinkers. 
Nor does the explanation that follows those quoted sen-
tences work, in my view, when limited to the effect on the lis-
teners’ role. The article argues, 
Advocacy speech represents a form of exercise of thinkers’ 
interests in developing their moral agency and in treating 
one another well by attempting to discern and to persuade 
others of what each of us or what we together should think 
and do. By contrast, non-press, business corporate and 
commercial speech, by design, issue from an environment 
whose structure does not facilitate and, indeed, tends to 
discourage the authentic expression of individuals’ judg-
ment.13 
Yet again, though the environment in which the speech is 
created may affect the development of speakers as thinkers, 
that environment will have little effect on the development of 
listeners as thinkers.14 
 
 11. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 296. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. Likewise, Ed writes that “The structural compulsion of the market means 
that neither liberty nor autonomy is at stake [as to commercial speech], at least to the 
extent this sphere works according to its ideal.” Baker, supra note 3, at 273. 
 14. Ed similarly says that his “essential claim” is—quoting the First Nat’l Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti dissent—“[W]hat some have considered to be the principal function of 
the First Amendment, the use of communication as a means of self-expression, self-
realization, and self-fulfillment, is not at all furthered by corporate speech. It is clear that 
the communications of profitmaking corporations . . . do not represent a manifestation of 
individual freedom or choice.” Baker, supra note 3, at 274 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804–05 (1978) (White, J., dissenting)). This sounds like a 
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Listeners’ development as thinkers might be affected by 
the particular content of the work—for instance, by whether it 
contains elaborate reasoned argument and factual information 
or just vapid sloganeering and unreliable puffing. But there are 
intellectually useful and intellectually useless or harmful exam-
ples in all genres, whether advertising, corporate-funded advo-
cacy, or non-corporate-funded advocacy. 
Ed seems to dismiss the value of commercial speech to lis-
teners’ autonomy by arguing that commercial speech “only 
seeks behavior that the listener now instrumentally values be-
cause of how the speaker has changed [the listener’s] options,” 
rather than “seek[ing] to persuade the listener on agreement in 
values.”15 But that seems like an oddly truncated analysis of 
commercial speech: Much commercial speech both appeals to 
the listener’s values and seeks to subtly influence the listener’s 
values (albeit for the speaker’s economic purposes, the same 
purposes that animate much speech that does not fall within 
the “commercial speech” category). Consider, for instance, ads 
that seek to persuade listeners that buying a certain product is 
good for the environment, for American labor, or for some 
charity to which the seller donates part of the profits. 
And Ed’s analysis also seems like an oddly truncated ap-
proach to autonomy. Why shouldn’t our autonomy as listeners 
include access to information that helps us better accomplish 
our instrumental goals, even if those goals are simply to get the 
most that we can for our family and ourselves? 
Perhaps the right to buy certain products that one wants 
might be an aspect of autonomy that is properly regulable as a 
“mutual exercise of [market] power” that should “be subject to 
collective (legislative) control.” But we’re not talking here 
about a right to buy free of government regulation, but rather a 
right to listen free of government regulation. And government 
attempts to stop listeners from hearing arguments affect listen-
er autonomy whether the arguments are “you should buy this 
supposedly environmentally friendly product,” “you should buy 
this product that will help your pocketbook,” “you should vote 
 
focus on the supposed absence of speakers’ autonomy interests in corporate speech, 
without attention being paid to listeners’ autonomy interests. 
 15. Baker, supra note 3, at 274. 
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for this supposedly environmentally friendly policy,” or “you 
should vote for this policy that will help your pocketbook.” 
I suppose one answer might go like this: We should care 
both about speakers as thinkers and about listeners as think-
ers. When a restriction interferes with the thinking of both 
groups, the presumption of its invalidity is strongest. When it 
interferes only with the thinking of one group—such as with 
commercial and non-media corporate speech—the presump-
tion is weaker. 
But the dead author example suggests that this isn’t so. As 
I mentioned, I know of no cases that have treated the works of 
dead authors as less constitutionally protected than the works 
of live authors, or of any arguments that have been made for 
such lesser protection. Listeners’ interests (or perhaps the very 
modest speaker interests of the living redistributors of the dead 
authors’ works) have apparently been seen as justifying full 
constitutional protection for dead authors’ works. And this 
judgment seems to me to be right. 
What’s more, note that some of the examples given in Part 
I were themselves originally corporate speech. The leaked in-
ternal corporate report (later published verbatim by a journa-
listic Web site), like the published corporate advocacy, was 
originally created by corporate employees; under Seana’s and 
Ed’s analyses, both the report and the advocacy are thus of 
equally little value to speakers-as-thinkers or to speaker auton-
omy.16 But both may be read by readers who aren’t just reading 
them on the corporate dollar; the two kinds of corporate-
created speech are thus of equally great value to listeners-as-
thinkers. 
So the thinker- and autonomy-based theories, it seems to 
me, do not explain why commercial speech and non-media cor-
porate speech should be less protected than other speech. 
There might be other explanations for this difference in protec-
 
 16. The difference can’t just be that the leaked document was published by some 
intermediate recipient: As I noted above, such a simple decision is likely to do much less 
for the publisher’s development as thinker than writing ad copy or corporate advocacy 
does for the employee’s development as thinker. And the publisher may be no less moti-
vated by economic gain than is the corporate employee. 
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tion—but they would have to come from other theories of free 
speech.17 
III. SPEECH CREATED BY EMPLOYEES 
This leads me to one more category of speech: speech writ-
ten by people employed to speak by the media and by advocacy 
groups. Unsurprisingly, much such speech is deeply affected by 
financial incentives and by managerial commands. Some writ-
ers might be given a comparatively free hand by their employ-
ers, but many reporters and many employees of political advo-
cacy groups are indeed greatly constrained in what they can 
write. 
Such speech strikes me as hard to distinguish from speech 
written by the employees of other organizations, including the 
employees of business corporations. For instance, Seana argues 
that “non-press, business corporate and commercial speech, by 
design, issue from an environment whose structure does not fa-
cilitate and, indeed, tends to discourage the authentic expres-
sion of individuals’ judgment.”18 But reporters are also substan-
tially constrained in their “authentic expression of [their] 
judgment,” whether by their editors’ commands or by the de-
sire to entertain or please readers. 
People who write the Sierra Club’s press releases are like-
wise constrained in authentically expressing their judgment. 
For them as for people who write business corporations’ press 
releases, “external . . . pressures render more tenuous any cha-
ritable presupposition that such speech is sincere, authentic, or 
the product of autonomous processes.”19 
To be sure, many people who work for the Sierra Club do 
so because they believe in the Club’s goals. Some reporters go 
to work for particular magazines or newspapers because they 
respect the editors, and want to be guided by the editors’ or-
ders—or expect their editors to give them a good deal of flex-
ibility. 
But many people likewise go to work for particular busi-
nesses because they like the business’s products, and thus ge-
 
 17. In particular, I’m not sure whether and to what extent the commercial speech 
doctrine might be justified by some other First Amendment theory. 
 18. Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 296. 
 19. Id. at 297. 
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nuinely feel the enthusiasm with which they are asked to infuse 
the business’s press releases or advertising. In any case, I don’t 
see why the precise degree of likely agreement between the 
writer and his superiors, should affect the constitutional status 
of the organization’s speech. 
Top managers of media enterprises or advocacy groups are 
less constrained, but even they may be considerably con-
strained—and sometimes entirely motivated—by a desire to 
make money, or to raise money. Indeed, “the competitive 
structure of the economic market and the narrowly defined 
aims of the corporate or commercial entity place substantial 
pressures on the content of corporate and commercial speech.” 
But these factors also place substantial pressures on the content 
of media speech, and similar factors place considerable pres-
sures on the content of advocacy group speech. 
Of course, one could focus just on whether the speech re-
flects the “authentic expression of [the] judgment” of top man-
agers who control the speaking employees, rather than of the 
speaking employees themselves. But corporate press releases 
and advertising would still remain hard to distinguish from 
speech in a newspaper editorial or an advocacy group press re-
lease. After all, I suspect that top managers of businesses au-
thentically believe much (even if not all) of the self-praising 
and self-serving statements that their businesses put out. 
There’s little reason to doubt the authenticity of a former GM 
chairman’s beliefs that “what [is] good for our country [is] good 
for General Motors and vice versa”—it’s human nature for 
people who run organizations to believe in the value of their 
organizations and the organizations’ products.20 
Now of course the work of even the most just-the-facts re-
porters—or of satisfy-the-customers magazine writers, or of 
keep-donors-donating press release writers—involves a great 
deal of thinking and creativity. All writing, even constrained 
writing, involves this. Consider the paid lawyer, whose argu-
ments are dramatically constrained by the “narrowly defined 
aims” of serving his clients, aims that “place substantial pres-
sures on the content” of the lawyer’s speech and “tend[] to dis-
courage the authentic expression of [the lawyer’s judgment]”; 
 
 20. Testimony of Charles E. Wilson before the Senate Committee on Armed Ser-
vices (1953), cited in Charter Twp. of Ypsilanti v. General Motors Corp., No. 92-43075-
CK, 1993 WL 132385, at *10 n.38 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 1993), rev’d, 506 N.W.2d. 556 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1993). 
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despite this constraint, writing a brief surely helps develop the 
lawyer as thinker. Yet writing advertising copy, corporate pub-
licity, or corporate advocacy aimed at persuading legislators or 
voters, is an intellectual task as well. It both requires thinking 
and helps develop the author’s thinking. 
So again it’s hard to distinguish the paid, constrained, non-
autonomous journalist, advocacy group publicist, lawyer, cor-
porate publicist, and advertising professional. All are con-
strained. All may be saying things that don’t authentically 
express their judgment. All are thinking. All say things that can 
influence listeners and thinkers. The thinker-based theory, it 
seems to me, does not persuasively explain why they should be 
treated differently. 
Ed’s response to this, I take it, would have been that the 
institutional press is protected by the freedom of the press, for 
reasons that are indeed related to democratic self-government 
rather than autonomy.21 (I’m not sure how he would have re-
sponded as to the speech of people who work for advocacy 
groups.) 
But why should the institutional media—including the 
business corporations in the institutional media—have greater 
constitutional rights than others who want to use “press” tech-
nology (which is to say the technology of mass communication) 
to express their views?22 Voters, autonomous citizens, and 
thinkers can find much that informs their judgment in publica-
tions by non-media business corporations, media business cor-
porations, labor unions, other advocacy groups, and so on. 
Of course, listeners can also find much that is false, mis-
leading, or self-interested in all those groups’ publications. 
Falsehoods and shadings of the truth, deliberate or inadvertent, 
are not uncommon in the speech of professional advocates, 
opinion journalists, newspaper editorial writers, and even re-
porters. And even if some media organizations and nonprofit 
organizations especially value their reputations for accuracy, 
and take pains to protect them, that is hardly true of all such 
organizations (whether the opinionated ones or the supposedly 
 
 21. See Baker, supra note 3, at 274–76. 
 22. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a 
Technology?—From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (ga-
thering evidence that the Free Press Clause has long been seen by American courts as 
treating all users of mass communications technology equally, whether or not they are 
members of the institutional press). 
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objective ones). Again, the source of the speech does not seem 
relevant to listeners’ democratic self-government any more 
than to listeners’ autonomy. 
I’ve heard some argue that media and advocacy group 
speech should nonetheless be more protected than speech by 
nonmedia business groups, because media and advocacy groups 
are especially major contributors to public debates. And media 
organizations and advocacy groups do play an extremely im-
portant role in such debates, which gives them disproportionate 
power both for good and for ill. 
Yet while listeners as thinkers of course benefit from me-
dia and advocacy group speech, constitutionally protecting 
non-media business speakers (whether as commercial advertis-
ers or political commentators) adds still more voices to the mix, 
and still more potential value to listeners. To the extent that 
these non-media business voices prove to be relatively peri-
pheral to most public discussions, this means that listeners get 
less value from them, but also that there is less possibility for ill 
stemming from free speech emanating from these voices. And 
to the extent that we might fear that speech by non-media 
business corporations will be so influential that it may cause 
great ill, that would suggest that such speech has indeed be-
come central to the media diets of listeners-as-thinkers—which 
is all the more reason to protect it. 
 
* * * * 
 
There is much that is persuasive in Ed Baker’s and Seana 
Shiffrin’s arguments. They make a strong case that the contri-
bution of speech to self-expression, the contribution of speech 
to speakers’ and listeners’ lives as thinkers, and the interfe-
rence of speech restrictions with speakers’ and listeners’ auton-
omy are important reasons to protect speech. 
But it seems to me that their analysis cannot justify their 
conclusion that commercial speech and corporate-produced 
speech should be less constitutionally protected. To the extent 
this conclusion rests on the supposed lack of value of such 
speech to speakers, it shortchanges the interests of listeners. 
And to the extent this conclusion tries to show that the com-
mercial and corporate-produced speech lacks autonomy or 
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thinker-development value to listeners, it strikes me as unper-
suasive. 
